ABSTRACT
Some Canadian farms produce fox or chinchilla fur, but their numbers are dwarfed by the number of mink farms.2 In a similar vein, trapping is a fur-gathering practice that continues to exist in Canada to some extent, but it predominantly occurs in other areas of the country and is not discussed in this paper.3 Second, this paper does not explore the animal rights theory that it is inherently unethical for humans to use animals as resources. Enterprising farmers began to move with greater frequency into Canada's burgeoning fur farming sector.9 A group of mink farmers established themselves in Nova Scotia's Digby County during the 1930s.10 The availability of fish and eels made this a logical location to capture, breed, and raise the carnivorous and semi-aquatic mammals.11 The Nova Scotia Mink Breeders' Association formed in 1938,12 and its farmers reaped high profits as mink became the fur en vogue in the years following the Second World War.13 The Digby farmers followed in the footsteps of the Prince Edward Island ranchers who developed so many fox farming techniques. In practice, only one Canadian fur farmer has been convicted of violating this provision.20 The Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farmed Mink (the "Code") is a publication offering a detailed set of guidelines for the proper treatment of mink.21 However, animal law scholars have criticized this Code, along with others crafted by the National Farm Animal Care Council, for being of indeterminate legal force.22 These Codes are also flawed because they are written by farm operators rather than independent third parties.23 Nova Scotia has enacted more legislation that applies to fur farming than any other province. The Fur Industry Regulations focus on the adverse environmental impacts of mink farming.30 The Regulations address topics like feces and carcass disposal and soil tests.
ABSTRACT
The case comment reflects on the 2019 decision of the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, which ruled that citizens should be allowed to vote on whether to ‘expand the circle of rights holders beyond the anthropological barrier’,23 and the subsequent decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court to uphold the validity of the citizens’ initiative.24 Blattner and Fasel explain why including rights for non-human primates in a cantonal constitution could add value to their protection in comparison with the traditional animal welfare protection measures.25 While acknowledging that the change of law advocated by the initiative might have limited practical implications, they posit that the mere symbolism of the initiative is worthwhile.26 These two decisions form part of a recent judicial trend of challenging the absence of basic rights for non-human beings.27 However, it emerges from the case comment that these decisions are particularly original in three ways. [...]the courts addressed, possibly for the first time, the relationship between animal rights and federalism in order to evaluate whether the primate rights initiative would be inconsistent with federal law. The courts responded in the negative, finding that while the Swiss Civil Code precludes animals from having fundamental rights, the initiative sought to reform Swiss public law to alter the relationship between individuals and the state: as a result, cantons were free to extend rights to non-human animals.28 Secondly, the decision of the Federal Supreme Court departed from existing animal rights scholarship, which concentrates on the overlaps between human and animal rights. [...]it declared that the initiative ‘does not aim to extend existing human constitutional rights to animals, but instead seeks to create special fundamental rights for non-human primates’.29 Thirdly, the case resulted in an important opportunity for citizens to participate in lawmaking processes as it paved the way for ‘the first ever direct democratic vote on whether some non-human animals should be granted basic rights to life and to bodily and mental integrity’.30 While the two contributions adopt a different starting point – one grounded in a theoretical exercise, the other in the commentary of a judicial decision – they nevertheless converge in their claims that our legal systems need to be reconceptualized to better account for the non-human in our worlds. 3.